INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses one form of corporate growth, expansion through mergers. Specifically, it examines Canada's domestic merger activity for the years 1971,1976, 1981, 1986 and 1991 . To accomplish the above, two objectives are met. First, a literature review is conducted to properly ascertain the numerous motivations and théories that underscore merger behaviour. Second, through the use of log-linear analysis, the spatial flows of Canada's domestic merger activity are determined. The outline for the remainder of this paper is as follows : 1) définitions of mergers and acquisitions; 2) merger motivations and théories; 3) the geography of mergers in Canada; 3) data, methodology, and analysis; 4) log-linear analysis; and 5) conclusions. Nelson (1959) states a merger results when two or more independent enterprises combine to form one économie enterprise. An acquisition (or takeover) occurs when an acquiring firm acquires over fifty per cent of the equity of a target firm (Green, 1990) . From a business and économies standpoint it is clear that mergers and acquisitions are distinguishable. Spatially, however, mergers and acquisitions are indistinguishable as they both represent a process that transfers the corporate locus of control from the acquired firm to the acquiring firm (Dicken, 1976) and possibly from one urban centre (Census metropolitan area) to another (Semple and Green, 1983) . Therefore, the authors use the term "merger" to represent mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers.
DEFINING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

THE GEOGRAPHY OF MERGERS IN CANADA
In Canada, numerous researchers hâve examined mergers (Lorch, 1981; Green, 1987; Jorgensen, 1987; Knubley, Krause, and Sadeque, 1991; Rugman and Waverman, 1991; Shapiro, 1993; McDougall, 1995; Aliberti, 1998) . Lorch (1981) examined the transfer of corporate control in Canada's manuf acturing sector during the period [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] . He round Canada's corporate geographical space to be hierarchical in nature. Green (1987) determined that Canadian mergers had the propensity to concentrate around four metropolitan areas : Toronto, Montréal, Calgary and Vancouver. Jorgensen (1987) noted that in the 1980s nearly sixty per cent of Canadian acquisitions were by firms based out of the United States. Knubley, Krause and Sadeque (1991) examined various patterns and motivations for Canadian acquisitions abroad. Rugman and Waverman (1991) examined the level of foreign ownership and corporate strategy of Canadian mergers. Shapiro (1993) provided a conceptual approach to the collection of Canadian merger data : he stated that data should be gathered at the pre-acquisition, acquisition, and post acquisition periods in order to better measure, classify, and analyze merger activity in Canada. McDougall (1995) examined the économie impact of Canadian mergers on corporations and concluded : 1) firms that hâve been taken over by foreign firms initially increase their capital investment and their research and development expenditures; 2) profitability of firms increases when firms invest in production and use new technologies; and 3) as firms grow in size, the amount of research and development spending tends to decrease. Aliberti (1998) concluded that over time, government imposed distortions, market disequilibrium imperfections, market structure imperfections, market failure imperfections, and spatial imperfections had a significant impact on Canada's domestic and international mergers and acquisitions activity.
MERGER MOTIVATIONS AND THEORIES
There are numerous motivations and théories that underscore merger activity (see Table 1 ). Trautwein, 1990. From Table 1 mergers are considered a rational choice if they beneht the bidder's shareholders or the managers of the acquiring firm. If a merger benefits the bidder's shareholders net gains can be achieved through : synergies (Mathewson and Quigley, 1998) ; wealth transfers from customers; wealth transfers from target's shareholders; or private information. Respectively, thèse motivations for merger activity stem from four théories : synergy/efficiency theory; monopoly theory; raider theory; and valuation theory.
A merger can also benefit managers. If this is the case, the managerial/empire building theory is the motive behind the merger. The process theory is used to explain a merger, if a merger is an outcome of informational, organizational or political processes. If a merger is seen as a macroeconomic phenomenon i.e., to take advantage of a nation's fluctuations in its capital market, then the économie disturbance theory is used to explain the merger.
The organizational interdependence theory is used to explain a merger if the merger is a response to an unstable économie environment or régional uncertainties. A merger resulting from antitrust activity, économies of scale, gênerai business conditions, promotional gains and/or tax incentives, is explained through the external merger theory. Whereas, the multiple cause theory is used to explain a merger if no single motive or theory explains the merger. For example, one can use the process theory, disturbance theory and organizational theory, if a merger results from some or ail of : information, organizational or political processes, fluctuations in a nation's capital market, or as a response to régional uncertainties.
Last, a merger can be seen as a spatial phenomenon, consequently, the spatial merger theory should be used to explain the merger. Similar to théories in industrial économies, corporate geographers try to predict the expansionary pattern of firms from a spatial perspective (Taylor and Thrift, 1982) . Ûnlike industrial économie growth models that emphasize the restrictions of a firm's growth, corporate geographers emphasize the "internai structural metamorphosis associated with growth and its spatial manifestation" (Qu and Green, 1997) . This spatial manifestation occurs in four developmental stages : market pénétration, product development, market development, and diversification. From a spatial perspective, the résultant outcome of the developmental stages is that the corporation will be surrounded by a core région. Within the core région, the expansion of sales offices and production facilities occurs and eventually leads to interrégional and, later, international expansion. The expansion of a firm is, in essence, a "spatial learning process involving nested action spaces, information spaces, and décision spaces" (Taylor and Thrift, 1982) , in order to obtain greater accessibility to capital, information, and more sophisticated forms of technology.
The motivations and théories summarized in Table 1 are what hâve made corporations even larger and, it is thèse large corporations that are extremely important to the prosperity of national économies, particularly, in Western industrialized society (Watts, 1980) . Since thèse corporations possess many assets and employ many workers, the décisions that thèse corporations make at the headquarters level (control point) affect the growth and development of a counrry's urban System (Pred, 1974; Stephens and Holly, 1980) . The headquarters of thèse corporations hâve the capital resources, information and technology, to affect the development and implementation of thèse policies on a national-scale, sub-national scale and local-scale. Ultimately, thèse corporate policies affect the économie linkages that are currently in place in a counrry's urban hierarchy. Changes to thèse économie linkages may create disparities in régional development, especially, if an oligopolistic framework is in place within industries, as few firms will control économie activity and will accentuate the spatial concentration of control (Thorngren, 1970; Pred, 1973) .
DATA, METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS
The domestic merger data were compiled on a yearly basis in an aggregate form from the Investment Review Divisions of Industry Canada, for the years 1971, 1976, 1981, 1986, and 1991 . Thèse data were comprised of the location, city and province, of the acquiring and acquired firms, and the year of the merger transaction. Through initial tests, it was determined that there were only low levels of variation from year to year in merger characteristics. It was more parsimonious to choose représentative years that matched census years.
To détermine the spatial distribution of corporate control for the aforementioned years, a domestic spatial interaction model was developed from the log-linear analysis. Log-linear spatial interaction modeling is an excellent explanatory and exploratory tool for empirically finding and describing the spatial structure (flows) of the Canadian merger data. A number of log-linear models are developed, and the model that has the best goodness of fit (model has to meet the 5% significance level) to the data, is chosen.
Through log-linear analysis one can create a géographie contingency table which one can use to measure the relationships that exist among variables that are measured at discrète levels. In other words, log-linear modeling enables one to postulate multiplicative relationships that exist between the frequency cell counts in a contingency table and the parameters (multiplicative form of log-linear parameter estimâtes are denoted as beta parameters) of the model. The estimâtes are integrated in relation to the overall géométrie mean of one. Values of beta estimâtes above one indicate increased likelihood of merger occurrence while values less than one indicate decreased likelihood of merger occurrence. The parameter estimâtes are a measure of the effect or importance of a category in a variable while ail other effects are held constant. The parameters of the log-linear model can be statistically interpreted to represent spécifie interaction effects of the merger data. The contingency table produced from the log-linear analysis provides spatial flows from the data. Thèse flows can be represented in a merger matrix. The matrix comprises the locational attributes of the acquiring and acquired firm, and the year of acquisition of the acquired and acquiring firm. This matrix will allow one to essentially define the spatial flows of merger activity within Canada (the cities/ metropolitan areas that hâve had the greatest attraction to merger behaviour).
LOG-LINEAR ANALYSIS
Log-linear analysis is employed to examine Canada's domestic merger data. Due to data constraints, only a three way contingency table was employed with the following variables : (A) location of the acquiring firm; (B) location of the acquired firm; and (C) year of acquisition. This last variable enables for the examination of the interrelationships between the location of the acquiring and acquired firm, over time. In essence, the log-linear procédure tests the relationship of the location of the acquiring firm or the location of the acquired firm or the interaction between the two, and the effects of time on merger frequency counts (Green, 1987) . In addition, log-linear modeling enables for the disaggregation of the distance parameter (effect), unlike the gravity model. Log-linear modeling produces parameter values for each interaction pair that allows for the effect of distance to be disaggregated. In log-linear analysis, the main effects or parameter estimâtes account for the propensity a city has to conduct merger activity, based on the size of the city. Since this is the case, the interaction term could be logically assumed to be a distance dimension (Green, 1987) .
Once log-linear analysis was employed on Canada's domestic merger data, the following log-linear spatial interaction model was chosen. The aforementioned model implies that in order to fully comprehend the spatial effects of Canada's domestic merger behaviour, one must ensure that the following are controlled for : 1) the location of the acquiring firm; 2) the location of the acquired firm; 3) the year of merger activity; 4) the spatial interaction effects of the acquiring and acquired cities; 5) the spatial interaction effects of the acquiring cities and the time variable; and 6) the spatial interaction effects of the acquired cities and the time variable. Following, is a descriptive examination of Canada's domestic merger activity.
From a domestic acquiring city merger standpoint, it is apparent that Toronto's (2.91), Montreal's (2.11), Calgary's (1.34) and Vancouver's (1.13) beta estimâtes, are a level above other major Canadian cities (see Figure 1) . The beta estimâtes for each city implies that firms in thèse four centres hâve a greater propensity to acquire firm's in other Canadian cities, than do firm's in other Canadian cities. In essence, firms based out of Toronto are 2.91 more likely to acquire firms in other Canadian cities, than are firms in other cities. Firms based out of Montréal are 2.11 times more likely to acquire firms in other Canadian cities, than are other cities. Wliile firms based out of Calgary and Vancouver are 1.34 and 1.13 times more likely to acquire firms in other Canadian cities, than are other Canadian cities. Canada's other major cities ail hâve a beta value less than one, indicating that although firms in thèse centres do acquire firms in other Canadian cities, the propensity to conduct merger activity is less likely to occur from thèse centres, with respect to Toronto, Montréal, Calgary and Vancouver. In the case of Canadian cities that hâve the propensity to attract merger activity, Canada's four most dominant centres come to the forefront again. Toronto (2.3), Montréal (1.57), Calgary (1.34), and Vancouver (1.28) are more likely to hâve firms acquired from them, than any other major Canadian cities (see Figure 2 ). Following Although thèse centres hâve a beta value that is less than one, they still hâve firms from other Canadian cities acquiring firms in thèse centres, but to a less extent than do Toronto, Montréal, Calgary and Vancouver.
In the case of the years of merger activity, 1981 with a beta parameter value of 1.13 was the year where the greatest amount of domestic merger activity occurred. If one looks at the beta parameters for ail five years, it almost resembles a uniform distribution, indicating that although merger activity fluctuâtes over time, the fluctuations are not that great, at least for the five illustrative years of study. However, it is interesting to note that the beta parameters for the years 1971,1981, and 1986 are ail greater than one, indicating that merger activity was more likely to be conducted with greater frequency during those years than in 1976 and 1991. The reason why the beta parameters were greater than one for 1971, 1981, and 1986 was because thèse three years reflect high points of the merger cycles that were going on at the time (Mergers, Corporate Concentration and Power in Canada, 1988).
Above, the main effects or parameter estimâtes for Canada's cities housing acquiring firms, cities housing acquired firms, and the year of merger activity in Canada were given. Following, in Table 3, a spatial interaction table between Canada's acquiring firms and acquired firms cities is presented. It is important to note that Table 3 can be considered an origin-destination matrix. By fitting the log-linear model to the origin-destination contingency matrix, this is equal to a constrained gravity model (Willikens, 1983) . The interaction effects, produced in Table 3 , can then be related to physical distance (Green, 1987) .
Based on the beta parameters on Table 3 , one can ascertain that firms in Canadian cities are parochial in their merger préférences. Toronto (6.52), Montréal (7.19), Calgary (9.07), and Vancouver (4.67), are more likely to conduct merger activity within themselves than with any other Canadian city. The same can be said for the other Canadian cities in Table 3 .
Beyond this primary trend, however, there are firms within Canadian cities that demonstrate préférence to conducting merger activity with firms in certain cities. Toronto firms prefer to conduct merger activity with Montréal, Calgary and Vancouver firms. The mère size f actor of the cities of Montréal, Calgary and Vancouver is an explanation for why Toronto targeted those particular cities for merger activity. Montréal firms prefer to conduct merger activity with Toronto (size f actor), Ottawa and Halifax firms (proximity f actor). Calgary firms prefer to conduct merger activity with Edmonton and Vancouver firms (proximity f actor). Vancouver firms prefer to conduct merger activity with Calgary and Edmonton firms (proximity f actor). Furthermore, Table 3 illustrâtes that firms in other Canadian cities also show préférence to firms in spécifie cities, with respect to merger activity.
Furthermore, Tables 4 and 5 illustrate that, over rime, the effect of city spécifie conditions for both, the acquiring and acquired cities, foster or discourage the occurrence of merger activity. In the case of Canadian acquiring cities, firms in each city shows preferential treatment to a spécifie year, when conducting merger activity. Table 4 illustrâtes this point. In the case of acquired domestic firms' cities, firms in some Canadian cities show preferential trearment to a spécifie year, when conducting merger activity. Table 5 illustrâtes this point. According to Table 5 , Halifax and Winnipeg firms targeted the year 1971, Edmonton, Ottawa and Québec City firms targeted the year 1981, Hamilton, Montréal, Toronto and Vancouver firms targeted the year 1986, and Calgary firms targeted the year 1991, to hâve more firms acquired from it through merger activity, than any other year.
Furthermore, Table 5 illustrâtes that Montréal and Québec City did not prefer the year 1971, Halifax, Hamilton, Toronto and Vancouver did not prefer the year 1981, Edmonton, Calgary, Ottawa and Winnipeg did not prefer the year 1986, to hâve less firms acquired from it through merger activity, than any other year. While not one city chose 1976 or 1991 as the years to hâve less firms acquired from it. For the most part, from an acquiring and acquired firms city standpoint, merger activity occurred with less frequency in the years 1976 and 1991 because thèse years were low points on the merger cycles, and with greater frequency in the years 1971, 1981, and 1986 because thèse were high points on the merger cycle (Mergers, Corporate Concentration and Power in Canada, 1988) .
